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The International Health Regulations (2005),
the threat of populism and the COVID-19
pandemic
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Abstract
The global response to the COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare weaknesses and major challenges in the international
approach to managing public health emergencies. Populist sentiment is spreading globally as democratic nations
are increasing their support for or electing governments that are perceived to represent “traditional” native
interests. Measures need to be taken to proactively address populist sentiment when reviewing the IHR (2005)
effectiveness in the COVID-19 pandemic. We discuss how populism can impact the IHR (2005) and conversely how
the IHR (2005) may be able to address populist concerns if the global community commits to helping states
address public health threats that emerge within their borders.
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Background
The global response to the COVID-19 pandemic has laid
bare weaknesses and major challenges in the inter-
national approach to managing public health emergen-
cies. Specifically, the International Health Regulations
(IHR (2005)), the primary law governing the global re-
sponse to such events, did not appear to succeed in its
objectives – controlling the spread of a severe public
health threat while avoiding unnecessary interference
with international traffic and trade. As the pandemic
spreads and national economies decelerate, scholars,
public health officials, and world leaders are asking
whether the situation may have been different if coun-
tries had fulfilled their legal obligations to both report to
the World Health Organization more robustly and fol-
low its travel and trade guidance more faithfully. These
questions are all the more urgent given the populist
resistance that has mounted against public health mea-
sures in some countries, including rapid re-opening of
the economy and general lack of acknowledgement of
the extent of the threat within their borders [1].
While several reasons may explain the apparent failure
of the IHR (2005) attention should be focused on the
circumstances that are likely to envelop its review and
revision as a sixth and by far most severe public health
emergency of international concern – the legal trigger-
ing language of the IHR (2005) – afflicts the world. The
IHR (2005) were formulated during an epoch of opti-
mism in global institutional cooperation. In contrast, at
present populist sentiment has been spreading globally
over the past decade as nations are increasing their sup-
port for or electing governments that are perceived to
represent “traditional” native interests [2]. As the world
emerges from the COVID-19 pandemic efforts to recon-
struct a new global public health world order will need
to account for the populist skepticism that now faces
evidence-based public health measures, a skepticism that
has resulted in delayed responses to the pandemic,
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underplaying of the risk and thus potentially contributed
to avoidable illness and death [1].
In this commentary we discuss the potential impact of
populist/nativist sentiment on the IHR (2005), how this
was manifested during the response to the COVID-19
pandemic and how populist concerns should be ad-
dressed when re-evaluating the IHR (2005) in the after-
math of the pandemic.
Main text
Populist sentiment and global governance
Populism refers to movements which appeal to local
populations who believe that their needs are not priori-
tized by ruling elites [3]. An important aspect and con-
tributor to rising populist sentiment is engagement of
nations in international agreements (e.g., the Paris Cli-
mate Agreement, multilateral trade agreements), inter-
governmental institutions (e.g., United Nations and
specialized agencies like the World Health
Organization), and transnational alliances (e.g., European
Union, NATO). Fueling the disenchantment is the belief
that these regimes subordinate the interests of nation
states to those of the international community and that
the national populace does not have a voice in the
decision-making process but rather that these decisions
are being made by unaccountable elites [4].
The Brexit controversy and the United States’ with-
drawal from its commitments to the Paris Climate
Agreement are two tangible impacts of the rising popu-
lism reacting to international governance. Somewhat less
discussed is the potential impact of populism on highly
impactful health arrangements such as the WHO’s Inter-
national Health Regulations (2005) [5, 6]. The IHR
(2005) impose significant requirements upon States Par-
ties and some suggest the treaty represents one of the
most invasive international agreements vis-à-vis impact
on national sovereignty [7]. Thus, they have the potential
to trigger many of the populist concerns expressed over
other international governance arrangements. With the
response to COVID-19 some of these concerns have be-
come more evident as local protests against social dis-
tancing measures proliferate as does skepticism of
foreign countries and international institutions.
IHR (2005) national sovereignty and national interests
The IHR (2005) include requirements for the develop-
ment of States Parties’ capacity to rapidly identify, re-
port, and respond to potential public health emergencies
of international concern (PHEIC). As the IHR were ap-
proved unanimously by the World Health Assembly,
these requirements are legally binding on countries with
the exception of some technical exceptions called “reser-
vations.” The IHR also provides WHO with the author-
ity to independently collect surveillance data on
potential PHEICs within a country’s borders, report this
information to other potentially affected countries, and
to issue recommendations, such as trade and travel advi-
sories, to control the spread of these threats [8].
Like most international agreements, there are no for-
mal penalties associated with non-compliance. Some
low- and middle-income countries argue that they lack
the resources necessary to fulfill the agreement’s man-
dates and some large, middle income countries have de-
viated from WHO recommended measures precisely
because of the economic effect of those measures. In-
deed, some suggest this agreement is particularly advan-
tageous for wealthier countries, who are better able to
mobilize their own resources and do so more quickly
should a global health threat be reported through IHR
mechanisms. For poorer countries, the IHR require-
ments potentially divert limited public health financial
and human resources from tackling domestic public
health threats such as HIV, tuberculosis and malaria
which have a more immediate impact on the health of
their populations. Furthermore, reporting public health
events has in past epidemics led to the imposition of un-
justified trade and travel restrictions upon reporting
countries [9, 10].
Compliance with the IHR could thus stoke two kinds
of populist resentment. First, reporting notifiable events,
while potentially negatively affecting any country result-
ing in reticence to report, may disproportionately bur-
den poorer constituencies [11]. For example, reporting
of a possible animal borne illness that has the potential
to cross international borders could be viewed as having
a negative impact on farmers and local markets in poor
countries for the (speculative) benefit of consumers in
richer countries. This has emerged as a concern with the
reluctance of China to close its wet markets, a potential
source of the current pandemic [12]. Given that in the
early stages of evaluating potential threats there is often
uncertainty as to the nature and extent of the threat, de-
cisions to report involve some level of discretion. While
the National Focal Point (NFP) of a State Party is ex-
pected to report such events, other ministries may be re-
quired under national law to approve such a notification.
Thus, conflicts may occur where a ministry perceives
that an event does not meet reportable criteria but the
NFP perceives that it does. In these situations, there is a
risk that reporting an event could stoke populist senti-
ment – particularly the view that a national government
is prioritizing its international commitments over the in-
terests of its local population. This burden may weigh
disproportionately on less well-off citizens within
countries.
Second, the IHR necessarily imposes obligations on
national governments, which ostensibly could pose
trade-offs with authority generally enjoyed by
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subnational, provincial or state governments. Many of
the IHR requirements related to detection, reporting and
response may constitutionally lie with local or state/pro-
vincial governments and may not fall under national
competencies. In systems where local or state/provincial
governments are viewed as more responsive or legitim-
ate to local needs and interests, the conflict may gener-
ate populist resistance to international health
agreements, especially where local and national author-
ities disagree about reporting an event [13, 14].
Populism and the response to COVID-19
Distrust of the WHO and global approaches to man-
aging pandemics amongst some nations have been
highlighted in the response to COVID-19 [1]. Issues re-
lated to the transparency of States Parties and their will-
ingness to report have emerged, particularly with respect
to disclosure surrounding the original outbreak in Wu-
han, China. The WHO has also been accused of delaying
the declaration of a PHEIC and not calling for needed
travel restrictions [15, 16]. Virtually every country in the
world has exceeded WHO guidance on travel. Partly as a
consequence of populist sentiment combined with dis-
trust of the WHO, the United States has announced its
decision to cease funding of the organization [17]. Fur-
ther evidence of the impact of populist sentiment is the
reluctance of countries with purportedly populist gov-
ernments, such as the United States, Brazil and the
United Kingdom, to follow WHO guidance. In the UK
this was manifest by the initial “herd immunity’ as op-
posed to “lockdown” strategy. In the United States and
Brazil there have been efforts to downplay the impact of
the pandemic and question international guidance. In
the United States the rapid re-opening and subsequent
resurgence in cases is illustrative of the negative conse-
quences of not following international guidance [1]. At
the same time it needs to be acknowledged that the
WHO guidance on both not imposing travel restrictions
and questioning the value of masks at the outset of the
pandemic may not have been supported by subsequent
evidence.
Managing the populist threat to the IHR
There are characteristics of the IHR that distinguish it
from international regimes that have faced more signifi-
cant populist backlash. First, the benefits of compliance
are more immediate and tangible than with, for example,
the Paris Climate Agreement or international economic
arrangements. In exchange for participation, the World
Health Organization and member states can and do offer
assistance to prepare for and manage emerging public
health threats—even though in practice international as-
sistance to lower-income countries to build core IHR
capacities has lagged [18]. This assistance can include
training and capacity development as well as support or
surveillance, reporting and response initiatives, Second,
serious public health threats by their nature adversely
affect local populations and economies, so having an
international coordinating mechanism to help when
those threats materialize resonates with a kind of intui-
tive understanding at all levels – local, national, and
global.
There are several steps that can be taken to proactively
address populist sentiment as revision of the IHR (2005)
potentially nears. First, the decision to declare a PHEIC
must be made after a transparent and accountable
process; so must decisions to recommend travel and
trade measures. Past declarations have been vulnerable
to criticisms that decisions were made behind closed
doors, by unaccountable bureaucrats, with potential con-
flicts of interest inadequately addressed [19]. This
emerged again, as a point of criticism with the declar-
ation of the COVID-19 public health emergency.
Second, WHO and the broader international commu-
nity must rapidly provide materially more support to
help States Parties to address reported PHEICs to ensure
that the local populace has a visible understanding of
the reciprocal nature and benefits of the IHR. Consider-
ation should be given to the creation of a compensation
fund for States Parties that are adversely economically
affected by timely reporting of potential threats.
Third, the local populations that are potentially most
directly impacted by IHR decision-making must have
awareness of how their country is managing and report-
ing on local threats and have an opportunity to express
their concerns about how the public health threat and
any actions to control its international spread may im-
pact them. It is this perception that the “so-called elites”
are not interested in these local issues that perhaps,
more than any other factor, has fueled the resentment of
participating in international pacts [4].
Conclusion
Highly transparent and positive local, national and global
responses to international health threats through the
IHR can help assure global health security and do so in
ways that are visible and valued by local populations. As
the world re-evaluates the IHR in light of the COVID-19
pandemic, revisions to how global health threats are
managed, instead of stoking populist concerns, could al-
leviate these concerns by demonstrating the tangible
benefits of participating in the global community.
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